A digital signature is a cryptographic method for verifying the identity of an individual. It can be a process, computer system, or any other entity, in much the same way as a handwritten signature verifies the identity of a person. Digital signatures use the properties of public-key cryptography to produce pieces of information that verify the origin of the data. Several digital schemes have been proposed as on date based on factorization, discrete logarithm and elliptical curve. However, the Swati Verma and Birendra Kumar Sharma [8] digital signature scheme which combines factorization and discrete logarithm together making it difficult for solving two hard problems from the hackers point of view. This paper presents the implementation of same, with the help of different tools and further analyzes them from different perceptions.
INTRODUCTION
The security of most the digital signature algorithms are based on the difficulty of solving some hard theoretical problems. Digital signature algorithms are based on the concept of public key cryptography given by Diffie and Hellman [1] . Since then many public key cryptosystems are introduced, which are based on either prime factorization (FAC) or Discrete Logarithm (DL) problems [2] .Although the schemes based on one of the above cryptosystem appears secure today, they may be unsecure in future. The security of the digital signatures can be enhanced by using factorization (FAC) or Discrete Logarithm (DL) problems, which are most commonly hard problems those can be used but not NP-complete. L. Harn [4] in 1995 showed that one can break the He-Kiesler [5] algorithm if one has the ability to solve the prime factorization.
Lee and Hwang [6] showed that if one has the ability to solve the discrete logarithms, one can break the He-Kiesler algorithm. Shimin Wei [7] showed that any attacker can forge the signature of He-Kiesler algorithm without solving any hard problem in 2002. Now, we implement the Swati Verma [8] signature scheme based on factorization and discrete logarithm problem both with different parameters and using a collision-free one-way hash function in this paper. 
SWATI

INITIALZATION
Let's select the following parameters:
p: a large prime p = 4p1 q1+ 1, where p1 = 2p 2 + 1, q1 = 2q 2 + 1, and p1, q1, p 2 , q 2 are all primes and let n = p1.q1.
g: an primitive element of Galois field GF(q). h (.) : a collision-free one-way hash function.
Further, the user chooses a private key X Є Z n such that gcd(X, n) = 1 and computes a corresponding public key which is certified by the certificate authority. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GENERATION
To sign a message M, the signee carries out the following steps. Where h is a collision-free one-way hash function defined by the system 4. (r1, r2, s) is a signature of message M. The signee then sends (r1, r2, s) to the verifier. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
IMPLEMENTATION
We implement the S.Verma and B. Sharma [8] 
Conclusion:
For developing this algorithm based on integral factorization and discrete logarithms , the large prime numbers and large digit numbers are used. There are some difficulties for implementation of these algorithms in MuPAD and MatLab. As per the method adopted for implementing these algorithms, the MuPAD and Matlab7.1 do not support large digit numbers and some mathematical functions. So there is limitation for secure key generation.
Due to this limitation, the Mathematica 9.0 is used. It supports for large integer number and maximum mathematical functions.
Looking at the advantage supported by Mathematica9.0, the Swati Verma, Birendra Kumar Sharma's algorithm is implemented in Mathematcia9.0. However, it was observed that programming controls in Mathematica9.0 are easier as compared to MuPAD and MatLab.
The S.Verma and B. Sharma [8] algorithm makes signature hard to break due the Hash Function, for 5 digit message, it will produce near about 78 digits Message Digest. The value for 't' is randomly generated based on condition that the g.c.d. of t and n should 1. In certain cases it takes more time to generate the value of 't'.
